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ABSTRACT
The airline industry’s current financial crisis has raised concerns over the ramifications of airline
bankruptcies for air service and the economy. Such bankruptcies, however, nearly always occur
when demand is weak, and, thus, when even healthy airlines are inclined to reduce flights.
Moreover, from a consumer and policy perspective, the real concern is total air service offered, not
the number of flights offered by a particular airline. We study all major U.S. airline bankruptcies
since 1984 in order to estimate the effect of bankruptcy on air service, controlling for demand
fluctuations and recognizing that competing airlines may increase service in response to a reduction
in flights by a bankrupt airline. We do not find substantial effects of bankruptcy on flights offered
or destinations served at large and small airports, but do find an impact at medium sized airports.
We estimate, however, that service changes due to bankruptcy are not large in comparison to typical
quarter-to-quarter fluctuations in service that occur at airports in the absence of carrier bankruptcies.
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nrose@mit.eduThe current ﬁnancial crisis in the commercial airline industry has engendered an
active debate over appropriate governmental policies. Proponents of government support
— instrumental in legislating a $5billion cash transfer and $10 billion loan guarantee
fund for U.S. carriers following September 11, 2001, and advocating additional support
for the industry today — point to the critical role that airlines play in the U.S. economy
and the devastating eﬀects airline failures could have on air service.1 Others argue that
most airlines continue to operate through bankruptcy resolution and that even a complete
shutdown of a major carrier, which rarely occurs, would stimulate expansion by other
airlines to replace its abandoned ﬂights.
This debate highlights the need to understand the causal eﬀect of airline ﬁnancial
distress on airline operations. Firms may eﬃciently respond to falling demand or rising
production costs by contracting output or exiting the market altogether. Declining prof-
itability in leveraged ﬁrms may induce covenant violations or default on debt obligations,
triggering a bankruptcy ﬁling. Without careful analysis, the coincidence of output changes
and bankruptcy or other measures of ﬁnancial distress could be misinterpreted as causal,
when in fact both result from worsened economic fundamentals that imply an eﬃcient
reduction in the equilibrium level of overall service. If observed service reductions result
solely from ﬁrms’ eﬃcient responses to adverse economic shocks, government transfers to
distressed airlines enrich airline stakeholders while providing little beneﬁt to consumers and
possibly postponing necessary industry adjustments. While determining whether there is
a causal link between ﬁnancial distress and reduced service is crucial, it does not in itself
resolve the policy debate. Even if ﬁnancial distress induces some service reduction, its im-
plications for government intervention are far from obvious, as we describe in the following
section.
In this paper, we focus on airline Chapter 11 bankruptcy ﬁlings, an extreme measure
of ﬁnancial distress. We use data from 1984 through 2001 to evaluate the eﬀect of major
bankruptcies on the number of nonstop domestic ﬂights and destinations served from U.S.
airports. Our results suggest that bankruptcy induces modest declines in service levels
that are statistically and economically signiﬁcant at midsize airports.
I. The Impact of Financial Distress
The standard neoclassical model of competitive markets abstracts from capital struc-
1 See, for example, U.S. Representative James Moran of Virginia on USAir’s loan guarantee application:
“The worst-case scenario is they go bankrupt, 40,000 people lose their jobs and more than 200 cities
lose their air service” (Eilperin, 2002, p. E1.)
1ture and ﬁnancing decisions. In this model, adverse production cost or demand shocks
reduce proﬁtability and generally imply lower equilibrium levels of industry output. Firms
responding to these conditions may reduce output or exit the industry. Decisions are
forward-looking, and sunk gains or losses, such as changes in the capitalized value of
industry-speciﬁc assets, do not aﬀect operational decisions. Service reductions in this
model are socially eﬃcient responses to new equilibrium conditions.
Introducing capital markets and debt ﬁnancing into the neoclassical model highlights
the diﬃculty of disentangling the eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress from that of underlying adverse
economic conditions. The reduced proﬁtability associated with lower demand or higher
costs may lead to both equilibrium output reductions and ﬁnancial distress, perhaps caus-
ing more-leveraged ﬁrms to default on debt obligations and triggering a bankruptcy ﬁling.
In this case, ﬁnancial distress and output reductions may be correlated even in the absence
of any direct causal link, but controlling for ”economic distress” would reveal no incremen-
tal impact of ﬁnancial distress or bankruptcy on the ﬁrm and its decisions. Andrade and
Kaplan (1998) ﬁnd some empirical support for this conclusion in their study of leveraged
buy-outs.
Moving beyond the neoclassical model raises the possibility that ﬁnancial distress
in general, and bankruptcy ﬁlings in particular, may have independent eﬀects on ﬁrm
decisions. When a ﬁrm ﬁles for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, its operations are put
under the authority of a bankruptcy judge responsible for overseeing negotiations among
the ﬁrm’s stakeholders and development of a reorganization plan for the ﬁrm. Ideally,
this protection would preserve the value of the ﬁrm, allowing economically viable ﬁrms to
restructure operations and ﬁnancing to emerge from bankruptcy protection, and inducing
economically nonviable ﬁrms to be liquidated in an eﬃcient, value-preserving manner.
There is considerable debate within the policy, legal, and academic communities over
the extent to which the operation of bankruptcy law achieves that ideal, as well as the
implications of possible shortcomings.
Service reductions associated with ﬁnancial distress may indeed be beneﬁcial. Com-
petition for consumers through more frequent ﬂights and larger networks may lead to
excessive service relative to the social optimum, as recognized by scholars throughout the
industry’s long history. Reducing service would then increase overall welfare. Moreover,
distress may be been induced in part by inferior management. If management at the failed
airline was mistaken in oﬀering as much service as it did in certain markets, the bankruptcy
process may force the airline to correct its prior misjudgments, perhaps even to replace
key managers. By compelling the ﬁrm to scale back its overly ambitious or optimistic
2operational plans, the process moves the airline toward a more eﬃcient outcome. As ri-
val airlines recognize these misjudgments, they will choose not to replace the withdrawn
capacity, and aggregate service in aﬀected markets will fall.
Yet, not all constraints imposed by ﬁnancial distress or bankruptcy administration
may be beneﬁcial or even benign. A growing literature suggests that capital structure
and ﬁnancial distress may have signiﬁcant consequences for product market decisions.
In her study of supermarkets, for example, Chevalier (1995) ﬁnds that highly-leveraged
supermarkets are likely to price much less aggressively, as the ﬁrm focuses on short-term
proﬁts at the expense of long-term value. Kahl (2002) develops a model in which creditor
uncertainty about which distressed ﬁrms are economically viable may lead to a tradeoﬀ
between learning about the ﬁrm’s fundamentals and quick resolution of distress. In this
model, distress may be allowed to persist, with consequent negative eﬀects on investment,
while creditors attempt to assess ﬁrm type. Hendel (1996) argues that ﬁrms might price
more aggresively when in ﬁnancial distress in order to generate liquidity. More generally,
ﬁrms operating under Chapter 11 protection may face a set of constraints imposed by
bankruptcy judges or creditor committees that prevent them from oﬀering service that
would maximize long-term value.
The empirical evidence on airline bankruptcies does little to resolve this uncertainty.
Borenstein and Rose (1995) ﬁnd that airlines approaching bankruptcy tend to reduce av-
erage fares, though rivals’ prices are largely unaﬀected and the price discount in general
dissipates after a Chapter 11 ﬁling. This work suggests that distressed carriers may expe-
rience temporarily reduced demand, which could lead to reduced operations, though that
is not explored in that 1995paper. 2 Pulvino (1999) ﬁnds that aircraft sold by distressed
airlines are sold at signiﬁcant discounts, but that these discounts are even greater for air-
lines operating under bankruptcy protection. He argues that the incremental discounts
suggest probable ineﬃciencies in the administration of bankruptcy protection: rather than
preserving ﬁrm value, managers of cash-constrained bankrupt ﬁrms may be encouraged to
may have an incentive to accept “low-ball” bids on assets, using the proceeds strategically
to improve the chances for approval of their reorganization plan. If aircraft sales are used
to generate cash (the ability to do so depending on whether the airline owns or leases its
equipment), reduced ﬂeet size may limit schedules and operations.
While this discussion has focused on the service oﬀered by a speciﬁc carrier in ﬁnancial
2 Some studies ﬁnd that rivals also are aﬀected by a pending bankruptcy ﬁling, though the decline
in rivals’ sales is smaller than that for the ﬁling ﬁrm; see for example, Kennedy (2000) for a cross-
industry study.
3distress, the general policy concern has been over the aggregate air service that will remain
when a carrier goes into distress. Financial distress or bankruptcy constraints, even if
present, will inﬂuence aggregate service levels only if service reductions by a constrained
ﬁrm are not oﬀset by expanded service oﬀered by competitors. If reduced operations by
a distressed or bankrupt carrier are rapidly replaced by its rivals, aggregate service may
be unaﬀected. This is less likely to be the case if ﬁrms are not homogeneous or entry
costs are substantial.3 With heterogeneous ﬁrms, one ﬁrm may be uniquely positioned
to supply a ﬂight, and its decision not to do so may lead to a reduction in total service.
This is more likely in network industries such as airlines, where there are strong production
complementarities across routes. In this case, ineﬃcient reductions by the constrained ﬁrm
may not be oﬀset. The analysis below focuses on the response of airport-level service to
bankruptcies by carriers operating at that airport, in an eﬀort to identify this aggregate
eﬀect.
II. Empirical Analysis of Airport Service Levels
Our analysis focuses on quarterly changes in domestic service at the 195largest U.S.
airports over the 1984 through 2001 period.4 Airport service levels change frequently
and substantially, as airlines reoptimize their networks in response to altered demand,
cost, and competitive conditions. In our sample, the median absolute value of quarterly
changes in airports’ total nonstop domestic ﬂights is greater than 4%. Fortunately, the rich
structure of airline markets and airline data provide substantial power in distinguishing the
eﬀect of a carrier’s bankruptcy from other determinants of aggregate service. Bankruptcy
decisions are made at the carrier level at a given point in time. Panel data on airports
provides variation over time in bankruptcy activity, as well as variation over airports in
their exposure to potential bankruptcy disruptions at a point in time, generated by network
heterogeneity across carriers.
The data construction and empirical model of airport service are described below.
We detail ﬁrst our measures of service at an airport, then the variables that capture the
eﬀect of bankruptcy, and ﬁnally, controls for demand and cost variations that might induce
changes otherwise attributed to airline ﬁnancial distress.
3 Firms may be homogeneous ex ante, but investments in capital and skills may still make them more
heterogeneous over time.
4 These are the top 200 domestic airports excluding ﬁve that are in U.S. territories (e.g., Guam).
We focus on domestic service because the number of international ﬂights and their operators remain
heavily regulated by bilateral treaties. We include an airport-quarter in the dataset only if the airport
recorded at least 500 nonstop ﬂights in both the current and previous quarter, an average of just
under 3 round-trip ﬂights per day.
4Service: Aggregate airline service for an airport-quarter is captured by two measures:
total nonstop domestic ﬂights to and from the airport, and the number of domestic des-
tinations that can be reached by nonstop ﬂights from the airport.5 These variables seem
most consistent with the current policy focus on the impact of airline bankruptcies on
available air travel options. Results from alternative measures, including the number of
seat-departures (ﬂights multiplied by capacity of each plane) and seat-mile-departures
(seat-departures multiplied by the nonstop distance of each ﬂight), are quite similar to
those reported below for ﬂights. The estimated ﬁrst-diﬀerenced models use changes in the
natural logs of these service measures from the previous quarter as the dependent variables,
dln(FLIGHTS) and dln(DESTINATIONS).
Bankruptcy: Airport-quarters vary substantially in their exposure to possible bankruptcy
eﬀects. In most quarters, there is no bankruptcy activity. When a carrier ﬁles for
bankruptcy protection, only the airports in its network are at risk from the ﬁling. Measur-
ing the exposure of a given airport-quarter to bankruptcy thus requires two components:
the date a carrier ﬁles for Chapter 11 protection, and the share of operations at that airport
accounted for by a ﬁling carrier. We identify 17 signiﬁcant airline Chapter 11 bankruptcy
ﬁlings over our sample period, shown in Table 1. Eight, marked with an asterisk, involved
a large domestic carrier, deﬁned as a carrier operating more than 25,000 domestic ﬂights
per quarter prior to bankruptcy.6 We report results based on these eight bankruptcies as
well as a set of results for the full panel of 17 ﬁlings. Neither set of results is materially
aﬀected by excluding the Eastern Airlines bankruptcy from the analysis.7
For each bankruptcy ﬁling i, we construct a one quarter-long interval centered on the
ﬁling date, FILED i. QTRFILEDit is equal to the fraction of quarter t that overlaps
with FILED i. Thus, for a ﬁling that occurs mid-quarter, QTRFILEDit is one for the
ﬁling quarter, 0 for all other quarters. For ﬁlings earlier in the quarter, QTRFILEDit will
be positive for the quarter before and the quarter of ﬁling, with the values in these two
quarters summing to 1; a similar construction applies for ﬁlings later than mid-quarter.
At each airport j, we construct BANKRUPT SHAREijt = QTRFILEDit ·
5 These are constructed from the U.S. Department of Transportation’s T-100 dataset, as processed
and distributed by Database Products, Inc.
6 In half of these, the restructured carrier emerged from Chapter 11 protection, though only Continental
and America West continue as major carriers today.
7 Eastern’s ﬁling followed by less than a week a strike that forced the airline to greatly reduce ﬂights.
This is surely not unrelated to the bankruptcy, but one might be concerned that it is an outlier. Our
analysis and conclusions, however, do not change substantially if we exclude Eastern’s bankruptcy.
5SHAREij,w h e r eSHAREij is the share of total nonstop ﬂights to and from airport j
accounted for by ﬁling carrier i. The share is based on ﬂights four quarters before the
carrier’s Chapter 11 ﬁling, to avoid the inﬂuence of any schedule changes in the quarters
immediately preceding the ﬁling. The sum of BANKRUPT SHAREijt across all eight
bankruptcy ﬁlings generates BANKRUPT SHAREjt, the variable used in the empirical
analysis. Two leads and lags of BANKRUPT SHAREjt are included to capture changes
in service over the six months leading up to and following the bankruptcy ﬁling quarter.
Seasonal and Time-Period Fixed-Eﬀects: The model includes a full set of airport-seasonal
eﬀects (φjq, q = 1,...,4) to control for systematic changes in service levels at a given airport
over the year. These pick up diﬀerences in seasonal demand patterns across airports as well
as any systematic growth or decline in an airport’s service over the sample period (captured
in the mean of the airport-seasonal eﬀects for each airport). For example, service to and
from many Florida airports systematically increases in the ﬁrst quarter and decreases in
the third quarter of the year. We also include a full set of time-period eﬀects (δt, t =
1984:4,...,2001:2) to control for aggregate macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, system-wide airline
cost changes, and other shocks common to all airports in a given quarter.8
Regional Economic Conditions: Fluctuations in local demand conditions may lead to ser-
vice changes at an airport not captured by the aggregate time-period or airport-seasonal
ﬁxed eﬀects. We control for regional variation in economic conditions with changes in
log of state-level employment and income. Employment is based on total nonagricultural
employment; income is aggregate personal income.9 To allow these variables to function
as leading or lagging indicators of air travel demand, we include in the model two lags and
leads as well as contemporaneous log income and log employment, all in ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
form.10
This yields the following ﬁrst-diﬀerenced empirical speciﬁcation:11
8 The time-period eﬀects will also pick up any indirect bankruptcy eﬀects that are common to all
airports, independent of the ﬁling carrier’s presence or activity.
9 Total nonagricultural employment is from http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?sa. Aggregate
personal income is from http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/sqpi/. Both measures are seasonally
adjusted; personal income is available only as a seasonally adjusted series.
10 There is a potential endogeneity of the macroeconomic variables, because an airline’s reduction in
employment that may be caused by entering bankruptcy would aﬀect local employment and income.
This eﬀect, however, is likely to be quite small, particularly since the macroeconomic variables are
measured at the state level.















φjq · Iqt +  jt
where Sjt is the service level measured as either nonstop ﬂights (FLIGHTS)o rn u m b e r
of destinations served nonstop from the airport (DESTINATIONS), Iqt is equal to one
if quarter t is the qth quarter of the year, otherwise zero. After generating all needed leads
and lags, the dataset contains a total of 12,805observations from 1984q4 to 2001q2. Table
2 presents summary statistics.
III. Results
We ﬁrst explore average bankruptcy eﬀects pooling across all airports in our sample.
Estimated bankruptcy coeﬃcients for each measure of airport service levels are reported
in table 3. As noted above, the model includes (unreported) airport-seasonal eﬀects,
time-period ﬁxed eﬀects and regional macroeconomic controls, each set of which is jointly
signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all regressions.12 The results in column 1 suggest substantial
ﬁling quarter eﬀects of bankruptcies on total ﬂights at an airport. The coeﬃcient of -0.232
(standard error, 0.069) on BANKRUPT SHAREt implies, for instance, that if a carrier
has 20% of the ﬂights at a certain airport, then in the quarter it ﬁles for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection, the total number of ﬂights at the airports declines by about 4.5%.
The cumulative eﬀect beginning two quarters prior to bankruptcy ﬁling and ending two
quarters after the ﬁling, measured by the sum of the ﬁve BANKRUPT SHARE variables,
is estimated at -0.106 (standard error, 0.099) and cannot be statistically distinguished from
zero.
The second column of Table 3 reports results measuring service by the total number
of nonstop destinations from an airport. The current quarter and cumulative 5-quarter
rors have not been corrected for the modest (-0.25) negative serial correlation in the residuals for
dln(DESTINATIONS), and hence may overstate true standard errors.
12 The individual leads and lags of the two regional macro controls tend to be imprecisely estimated, and
some point estimates are negative. The aggregate eﬀects, however, are positive and jointly signiﬁcant
in all regressions.
7eﬀects of bankruptcy on destinations are all quite imprecisely estimated, though the point
estimate of the cumulative eﬀect is roughly the same order of magnitude as for ﬂights.
We next explore whether bankruptcy eﬀects diﬀer by airport size, which varies sub-
stantially across our sample. Political concerns about airline bankruptcies have in some
cases focused on the largest airports and metropolitan areas, while in other cases more
concern has attached to service to smaller communities. We therefore divide sample
airports into three groups. The 26 “large” airports are those averaging more than 400
ﬂight operations per day during our 18-year sample, and include all large hubs. The 51
“medium” airports average between 100 and 400 ﬂights per day and include smaller hubs
(e.g., Memphis, Dayton, Washington Dulles), secondary airports in large cities (e.g., Oak-
land, Midway, Houston Hobby) and primary airports in midsize cities (e.g., New Orleans,
Indianapolis, Reno). The remaining 118 “small” airports average between 8 and 100 ﬂights
per day.13
Table 4 reports results for dlnFLIGHTS regressions that allow bankruptcy eﬀects to
vary across these three airport size categories while maintaining common time-speciﬁc
and regional macroeconomic eﬀects. The estimates suggest substantial heterogeneity in
service responses to carrier bankruptcies. The top panel reports bankruptcy coeﬃcients
by airport size for our base sample of 8 major carrier bankruptcies. The bottom panel
reports results using all 17 bankruptcies identiﬁed in Table 1. As the two sets of results are
quite similar, the detailed discussion focuses on the ﬁrst panel. Large airports exhibit much
smaller ﬁling-quarter eﬀects than does the pooled sample, and these cannot be statistically
distinguished from zero. In contrast, medium and small airports experience substantial
declines in ﬂights during the quarter of bankruptcy ﬁling. If a carrier had a 20% share of
ﬂights at a medium-sized airport, for instance, the estimate implies that total service at
the airport would decline by 5.0% in the quarter it ﬁled for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. At a
small airport, the same example would yield a 5.3% reduction in total service.
The aggregate 5-quarter eﬀect for large airports is estimated to be -0.132 (standard
error, 0.089). The estimate implies that if a carrier had a 20% share of ﬂights at an airport
prior to its bankruptcy, total service at the airports would decline by about 2.6% after it
ﬁled, but the 95% conﬁdence interval (-26%,+4%) fails to reject no bankruptcy eﬀect. For
medium-sized airports, the estimated aggregate eﬀect is much larger, a 9.3bankrupt. While
the conﬁdence interval is quite broad, it is bounded away from zero. At small airports, the
decline in ﬂights during the ﬁling quarter appears largely oﬀset by increases in subsequent
13 The data do not allowus to further distinguishing hub from nonhub airport bankruptcy eﬀects.
8quarters, leading to an estimate of virtually no change over the 5-quarter window. Once
again, however, the imprecision of the estimates leads to a large conﬁdence band.
Table 5reports corresponding results using dlnDESTINATIONS as the service mea-
sure. Results for large airports (column 1) and small airports (column 3) are essentially
unaﬀected by the selection of bankruptcy events. The point estimates for medium airports
(column 2) sometimes diﬀers across the two bankruptcy samples, though their conﬁdence
intervals exhibit considerable overlap. The 5-quarter bankruptcy impacts on DESTINA-
TIONS follow a similar pattern to the FLIGHTS results. At large airports, the 5-quarter
estimates imply that the number of destinations served declines by about 3.7% if a carrier
with 20% of the ﬂights at an airport ﬁles for Chapter 11 protection. For medium-sized
airports, the decline is estimated to be 8.3%. The conﬁdence intervals for these estimates
are broad, and just reject no eﬀect at the 5% level. For small airports, the estimated
cumulative bankruptcy eﬀect is small and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Taken together, these results suggest that the greatest impact of bankruptcy on service
occurs at mid-sized airports. Although the break points we use to deﬁne large, medium,
and small airports are somewhat arbitrary, the pattern of results are robust to a wide
range of alternative choices: small airports exhibit no signiﬁcant eﬀect over the 5-quarter
window, medium airports experience the greatest bankruptcy-induced declines, and the
estimated magnitude of both large and medium airport eﬀects increases as we use a cut
that moves more airports from the “medium” to “large” category.
It it is useful to put these results into context by comparing bankruptcy-induced
changes to the “typical” quarterly variation in service that occurs at airports as a con-
sequence of seasonal demand variation, macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, and other factors.
Table 6 reports the distribution of changes in service that occur in airport-quarters with
no signiﬁcant bankruptcy impact.14 Consider, for example, the bankruptcy of a carrier
with a 30% share of ﬂights at an airport. Our results suggest this would reduce total
ﬂights by 4.0% at a large airport. A change of this magnitude wouldn’t be particularly
unusual, occurring in nearly one in ﬁve large-airport-quarters absent bankruptcy. The
corresponding 13.6% change implied by our results for a medium airport would be more
unusual, falling in the third percentile of the no-bankruptcy distribution. For a carrier
with a 10% share of ﬂights at an airport, the total change in ﬂights is estimated to be 1.4%
at a large airport and 4.8% at a medium airport, neither of which would be likely to stand
out among the normal ﬂuctuations in service at such airports.
14 This excludes any airport-quarter at which a carrier in bankruptcy operated during the 5-quarter
window around its bankruptcy.
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We ﬁnd that airline bankruptcies reduce service at some airports. At large airports,
the eﬀect is weakly signiﬁcant, and the magnitude is not large in comparison to the nor-
mal ﬂuctuations in service. The estimated eﬀect is greatest at midsize airports where
bankruptcy of a carrier with a signiﬁcant share of ﬂights may reduce service by amounts
that would stand out from the typical quarter-to-quarter variation. At small airports,
a brief decline in service appears to be quickly oﬀset in the following quarters, with the
net impact over ﬁve quarters being small and statistically insigniﬁcant. These ﬁndings
suggest that bankruptcy has direct causal eﬀects on some airline operations. These eﬀects
merit further exploration and investigation. Our ongoing work attempts to decompose
bankruptcy eﬀects into ﬁling-carrier and rival carrier responses, in an eﬀort to discern how
much service is replaced by rivals’, and what are the key determinants of the replacement
decision.
The larger question — what are the social implications of the observed net service
declines? — is much more diﬃcult to address. The theoretical literature is ambiguous,
and the current state of empirical methods makes it unlikely that one could construct
reliable estimates of the welfare costs of alternative network conﬁgurations. Weiss and
Wruck’s (1998) case study of the Eastern Airlines bankruptcy may provide a cautionary
note on assessing the welfare eﬀects of possible bankruptcy constraints, and potentially, the
implications for current eﬀorts to mitigate or avoid airline bankruptcies. They argue that
the prolonged operation of Eastern Airlines following its chapter 11 ﬁling was facilitated
by “asset-stripping” that reduced the value of the ﬁrm by $2 billion, and that the tendency
toward such value-destruction may not be an aberration. “The temptation to use liquid
assets to prolong the ﬁrm’s survival, even if doing so destroys value, can prove irresistible.
In addition, such actions are easily rationalized; because they postpone the fallout of
painful outcomes, they appear to be the socially responsible thing to do. The avoidance of
painful decisions is more likely to arise when massive downsizing or shutdown is required.”
(Weiss and Wruck, 1998, p. 84).
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11Table 1: U.S. Air Carrier Bankruptcies, 1984-2001


















* indicates large domestic carrier, deﬁned as a carrier averaging 25,000 or more ﬂights in
the quarter prior to bankruptcy.
Table 2: Summary Statistics (N= 12,805)
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Flights 16541 26875 503 202423
Destinations 16.59 21.69 1 136
Bankrupt Share (large carriers) 0.0039 0.00249 0.0000 0.8000
Bankrupt Share (all carriers) 0.0043 0.0262 0.0000 0.8000
Employment (millions) 3982 3506 182 14721
Income ($millions) 208359 216208 6559 1131361
∆log(Flights) 0.00450.1437 -1.3721 1.4182
∆log(Destinations) 0.0012 1.1990 -1.6094 1.3862
∆log(Employment) 0.0051 0.0055 -0.0399 0.0344
∆log(Income) 0.0141 0.0117 -0.1093 0.2293
NOTE: Includes 12,805observations on 195airports for 1984q4-2001q2, omitting observa-
tions in which airport had fewer than 500 ﬂights during the observed quarter or previous
quarter.
12Table 3: Estimation Using All Airports
Dependent Variable dln(FLIGHTS) dln(DESTINATIONS)
Bankrupt Sharet+2 -0.024 -0.177∗∗
(0.048) (0.073)
Bankrupt Sharet+1 0.014 0.088
(0.045) (0.092)
Bankrupt Sharet -0.228∗∗ -0.088
(0.068) (0.100)
Bankrupt Sharet−1 0.042 0.054
(0.078) (0.116)
Bankrupt Sharet−2 0.088 0.011
(0.058) (0.088)
Five-Quarter Aggregate -0.107 -0.112
Bankrupt Share eﬀect (0.099) (0.164)
NOTES: Observations=12,805. Regional macroeconomic variables (employment and in-
come), airport-seasonal ﬁxed eﬀects (4 per airport), and time-period ﬁxed eﬀects (one per
quarter) not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ = signiﬁcant at 10% level.
∗∗ = signiﬁcant at 5% level.
13Table 4: Estimation of Bankruptcy Eﬀect on FLIGHTS By Airport Size
Dependent Variable: dln(FLIGHTS)
Using the 8 Large-Carrier Bankruptcies in Table 1
Aiport Size Large Medium Small
Bankrupt Sharet+2 0.0150.045 -0.040
(0.044) (0.106) (0.063)
Bankrupt Sharet+1 -0.050 -0.131 0.047
(0.035) (0.114) (0.059)
Bankrupt Sharet -0.066 -0.255∗∗ -0.273∗∗
(0.051) (0.111) (0.095)
Bankrupt Sharet−1 -0.093 0.040 0.092
(0.057) (0.131) (0.105)
Bankrupt Sharet−2 0.058 -0.187 0.147∗∗
(0.062) (0.218) (0.069)
Five-Quarter Aggregate -0.136 -0.488∗∗ -0.027
Bankrupt Share eﬀect (0.088) (0.216) (0.136)
Using All 17 Airline Bankruptcies in Table 1
Aiport Size Large Medium Small
Bankrupt Sharet+2 -0.058 -0.000 -0.022
(0.049) (0.083) (0.068)
Bankrupt Sharet+1 -0.006 -0.0350.069
(0.044) (0.085) (0.072)
Bankrupt Sharet -0.072 -0.283∗∗ -0.237∗∗
(0.050) (0.101) (0.088)
Bankrupt Sharet−1 -0.083 0.081 0.116
(0.056) (0.124) (0.096)
Bankrupt Sharet−2 0.059 -0.143 0.145∗∗
(0.060) (0.177) (0.065)
Five-Quarter Aggregate -0.121 -0.381∗∗ 0.070
Bankrupt Share eﬀect (0.085) (0.169) (0.135)
NOTES: Observations=12,805. Regional macroeconomic variables (employment and in-
come), airport-seasonal ﬁxed eﬀects (4 per airport), and time-period ﬁxed eﬀects (one per
quarter) not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ = signiﬁcant at 10% level.
∗∗ = signiﬁcant at 5% level.
14Table 5: Estimation of Bankruptcy Eﬀect on DESTINATIONS By Airport Size
Dependent Variable: dln(DESTINATIONS)
Using the 8 Large-Carrier Bankruptcies in Table 1
Aiport Size Large Medium Small
Bankrupt Sharet+2 -0.058 -0.130 -0.217∗∗
(0.049) (0.123) (0.100)
Bankrupt Sharet+1 -0.006 -0.103 0.141
(0.044) (0.136) (0.126)
Bankrupt Sharet -0.071 -0.099 -0.084
(0.052) (0.162) (0.137)
Bankrupt Sharet−1 0.013 0.081 0.069
(0.053) (0.133) (0.162)
Bankrupt Sharet−2 -0.069 -0.183 0.068
(0.054) (0.141) (0.122)
Five-Quarter Aggregate -0.191∗∗ -0.434∗∗ -0.024
Bankrupt Share eﬀect (0.093) (0.214) (0.235)
Using All 17 Airline Bankruptcies in Table 1
Aiport Size Large Medium Small
Bankrupt Sharet+2 -0.050 -0.145 -0.116
(0.049) (0.094) (0.099)
Bankrupt Sharet+1 0.001 0.1250.074
(0.043) (0.126) (0.123)
Bankrupt Sharet -0.075-0.267 ∗ -0.071
(0.052) (0.150) (0.130)
Bankrupt Sharet−1 0.021 0.0650.109
(0.052) (0.143) (0.147)
Bankrupt Sharet−2 -0.064 -0.026 0.095
(0.053) (0.136) (0.113)
Five-Quarter Aggregate -0.165∗ -0.248 0.092
Bankrupt Share eﬀect (0.092) (0.204) (0.217)
NOTES: Observations=12,805. Regional macroeconomic variables (employment and in-
come), airport-seasonal ﬁxed eﬀects (4 per airport), and time-period ﬁxed eﬀects (one per
quarter) not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ = signiﬁcant at 10% level.
∗∗ = signiﬁcant at 5% level.
15Table 6: Distribution of Percentage Change in FLIGHTS
at Airports with No Bankruptcy Eﬀect
All Large Medium Small
Airports Airports Airports Airports
1st Percentile -36.1% -13.1% -24.5% -40.5%
3rd Percentile -23.5% -9.8% -13.4% -27.5%
5th Percentile -17.2% -8.0% -10.1% -20.6%
10th Percentile -10.5% -5.6% -6.7% -12.8%
15th Percentile -7.4% -4.4% -5.2% -9.1%
20th Percentile -5.6% -3.6% -4.0% -6.9%
25th Percentile -4.2% -2.6% -3.2% -5.1%
Median +0.1% +0.4% +0.5% +0.1%
75th Percentile +4.9% +3.9% +4.4% +5.4%
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